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Reform in the international food aid
regime: the role of consensual
knowledge Raymond F. Hopkins

Achieving food security worldwide has emerged as a central goal governing the
use of food aid in recent years. In large part, this is attributable to shifts in
public pressures that have resulted from an increase in information about the
incidence, causes, and costs of hunger and from detailed studies concerning the
beneficial and harmful effects of food aid. 1 Since the 1950s, the opinion of
policymakers and much of the influential public in major donor states has
evolved in favor of using food aid as a vehicle to foster development-oriented
projects designed to alleviate the long-term food security problems of recipients, rather than merely serving as a remedy for the recipients' immediate food
shortages and an outlet for the donors' disposal of surplus food commodities.
An international epistemic community, consisting of economic development
specialists, agricultural economists, and administrators of food aid who not
only share this goal but also have a common scientific orientation grounded in
standard social science, played a major role in bringing about this shift in
This article draws on ideas published in my earlier article, "The Evolution of Food Aid," Food
Policy 9 (November 1984), pp. 345-62, and on papers presented at the meetings of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1987, and the International Studies
Association, London, April 1989. I am grateful to Stephen Krasner, Peter Cowhey, Peter
Katzenstein, Peter Haas, and M. J. Peterson for their comments and suggestions. I am also deeply
indebted to Owen Cylke, Jon O'Rourke, and their colleagues at the Agency for International
Development, an organization that provided a grant to Swarthmore College for the purpose of
organizing a series of conferences that were held in preparation for the 1990 farm bill and focused
on changes in the PlA80 legislation.
1. For examples of these shifts, see the testimony of Owen Cylke, the acting assistant
administrator for food aid at the Agency for International Development (AID), in U.S. Congress,
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Preparation of the 1990 Farm Bill,
PL480: Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 101st Congress, 1st
sess., 1989; World Bank and World Food Programme (WFP), "Food Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa,"
draft of a joint study, Washington, D.C., September 1990; Alan Berg, Malnourished People: A Policy
View (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981); and Vernon W. Ruttan, Why Food Aid? Surplus
Disposal Development Assistance, and Basic Needs (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, forthcoming), chaps. 1 and 2. Cylke's testimony was built on a series of workshops and
conferences held in 1988-89 and attended by scholars on food aid. The participants' interaction is
International Organization 46, 1, Winter 1992
© 1992 by the World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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opinion. 2 Over the years, the epistemic community members have undertaken
extensive analyses of the effects of food aid and of the nutritional needs of
recipient countries, bridged divisions among and within states over priorities
and criteria for providing food aid, proposed more efficient methods for
supplying the aid, and promoted their goal of development-oriented uses of
food aid. Reform in the principles, rules, and practices of the international
food aid regime testifies to the existence of a significant role for epistemic
communities in international affairs and to the impact of their ideas on politics.
The partial, incomplete quality of reform, however, also illustrates how and
under what circumstances the organized subnational interest groups can
succeed in their efforts to resist changes, even when those changes are widely
accepted and applauded as serving desirable collective ends.
A study of the evolution of food aid and the role played by intellectual critics
in its reform illustrates three points about the process of change relevant to the
study of international institutions. First, criticisms of norms and principles that
originally shaped the regime have fostered change.3 The norms governing food
aid exchanges, for example, arose from a set of national government policies in
which unilateral decision making heavily conditioned international outcomes;
in contrast, reforms have had a transnational basis. A major debate between
domestic agricultural policy interest groups and development-oriented theorists and agencies has shaped international food aid policy and criteria for
judging efficiency in resource allocation for both donors and recipients. 4 Like

an excellent example of the paths by which an epistemic community can nurture consensual
knowledge. The epistemic community's advocacy statements for policy reform and greater policy
coordination in the food aid donor community were reflected, for example, in the July 1990 farm
bill reforms for PU80 as set forth by both the Senate and the House and in the final bill that was
passed by Congress in October 1990 and signed into law in December 1990. The community's ideas
are also most incorporated in the position taken by the Cairns Group in the ongoing Uruguay
Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
2. For a discussion of the defining qualities of an epistemic community, see the following works
by Peter M. Haas: "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,"
in this issue of IO; and "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
Pollution Control," International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 377-404.
3. For a discussion of the defining qualities of regimes and their capacity to change, see Stephen
D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), chap. 1; and
Oran R. Young, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources
and the Environment," International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 349-75. In my article, I
sometimes use the terms "regime" and "institution" interchangeably. While some might question
this practice, there is considerable overlap in the two concepts, since a regime is one type of
institution. Moreover, both concepts emphasize the subjective elements of structure in human
affairs, rather than the objective or externalized elements; that is, they look at the distribution of
ideas, beliefs, goals, and so forth, rather than the distribution of wealth, military force, and the like.
My own understanding of the term "institution" derives from Talcott Parsons' The Social System
(New York: Free Press, 1964), in which Parsons refers to institutions as entities characterized by
"structured complementarity" among roles (p. 39). Neither "regime" nor "institution" is a term
that requires an exclusive focus on formal organizations or legal documents in order to discuss and
evaluate the reliability or cost benefits of international collaboration.
4. See D. Gale Johnson and G. Edward Schuh, eds., The Role of Markets in the World Food
Economy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983).
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many issues among states, the issues in this case have involved two-level
bargaining. 5 During the period from 1958 to 1990, dozens of international
conferences on food aid were held. While some were formal and involved
experts in national governments and in international bodies such as the United
Nations (UN) and World Bank, others were less formal and sponsored by
business or academic groups. From the debates at these conferences, a
consensus regarding the desirable norms and rules emerged among certain
development specialists, an epistemic community on food aid. This consensus
has provided the impetus for reform of the earlier norms and practices that
were based on surplus disposal of grains.
Second, principles of the food aid regime have become institutionalized.
During the 1980s, when food aid accounted for over 10 percent of official
development assistance and cost about $3 billion annually, about twenty-five
countries were donors and over a hundred were recipients of food. Given the
number of states involved in food aid, national and international negotiations
were necessary to avoid mutually disadvantageous outcomes. The principles of
the regime thus became institutionalized through the creation of the World
Food Programme (WFP), an intergovernmental body; through the adoption of
the Food Aid Convention, an international treaty setting a floor for food aid
donations; through the signing of memorandums of agreement and legal
contracts among hundreds of countries; and through the ratification of
increasingly complex national legislation. Such formal aspects of the food aid
regime fully satisfy the requirements of an international regime proposed by
most analysts. 6
Third, the dissemination of information about the incidence and causes of
hunger has had an impact on popular opinion, and this in turn has fostered
change in the food aid rules and practices. In the 1980s, an estimated 730
million people's diets in developing countries lacked sufficient calories. 7
Historically, one of the debates about food aid concerned whether the problem
of hunger stemmed from inadequate food production (a supply problem) or
from poverty and the inability of poor people to secure food (a demand
problem). 8 According to the developmentalists, it is possible for the international community to produce enough food to feed the world populace
adequately, particularly through the application of improved technology and

5. See Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic of Two-Level Games,"
International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.

6. For a discussion of the formal, lawlike attributes of regimes, see Robert 0. Keohane, After
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1984); and Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International
Organization as an Art of the State: A Regime Critique," International Organization 40 (Autumn
1986), pp. 753-76.
7. World Bank, Poverty and Hunger (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1986).
8. See Amartya K. Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981); and Susan George, "Food Strategies for Tomorrow," mimeograph, the
Global Hunger Project, New York, December 1987.
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scientific understanding of farm systems. 9 The broad consensus on this point
has provided a link between the epistemic community developmentalists and
the public in various parts of the world. Evidence that public interest in ending
hunger has grown in recent decades is reflected in responses to surveys, in
pressures placed on legislators by their constituencies, and in the organized
activities of lobbying groups, some of which are worldwide in scope, such as the
Hunger Project. Yet neither the acceptance of the link between poverty and
hunger nor the popular support for efforts to curb hunger can ensure that food
aid will have its intended effects. One of the dilemmas of food aid is that efforts
to provide it have often ended in "deadlock" or mutual loss. 10 And one of the
paradoxes is that the aid, when given for military or ideological reasons, has
often led to an increase in hunger-as occurred, for example, in Vietnam in
1965-73, Bangladesh in 1974, and El Salvador in 1988-89. 11
The arguments presented below are divided into three parts. The first
section of the article reviews the political history of the food aid regime and
describes how the regime principles and rules evolved. The second section
discusses the epistemic community's knowledge base in shaping the food aid
regime. It argues that as relevant "knowledge" changed, consensus about
particular regime features also changed and brought about the demand for new
regime practices, such as the use of triangular transactions and the purchase of
food from local producers. The third section explores the impact of the
epistemic community on government policies and views with respect to four
issues concerning food aid: disincentives, the efficiency of resource transfers,
the criteria for allocation of food aid, and the conditions imposed on recipients.
The pattern of allocation by the United States, the largest food aid donor,
illustrates clearly the claim that neither ideas nor power shifts alone are
sufficient for explaining change in international behavior.

The food aid regime from 1954 to 1990
The origins of food aid lay in U.S.-led efforts to address simultaneously several
international problems of recovery from war, economic crisis, and food trade
imbalance. From 1945 to the early 1950s, recovery from World War II
9. See William W. Murdoch, The Poverty of Nations: The Political Economy of Hunger and
Population (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); and John Mellor et al., eds.,
Accelerating Food Production in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1987).
10. See Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1986).
11. See Mitchel Wallerstein, Food for War: Food for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980);
Dean McHenry and Kai Bird, "Food Bungle in Bangladesh," Foreign Policy 27 (Summer 1977), pp.
72-88; and testimony of Raymond F. Hopkins, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on
Hunger, Restructuring Food Aid: Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Hunger, 101st
Congress, 1st sess., 1989.
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encouraged massive noncommercial movements of food. Food shortages in
some countries were juxtaposed with surpluses in others, principally the United
States. 12 Following a decade of ad hoc arrangements for food aid, on 10 July
1954, President Eisenhower signed Public Law 480 (PL480), an act that was
subsequently built into U.S. farm legislation and established the United States
as a principal and permanent provider of food aid. During this period, Canada
was the only other substantial donor. Thus, the motivation and ideas predominant in the establishment of the regime derived from U.S. domestic material
interests. Development economists were largely skeptical outsiders to its
design. PU80 authorized the use of U.S. government-owned surplus agricultural commodities as part of the American foreign assistance program. From
1955 to 1964, it drew funds from the agricultural budget to do this; since then, it
has drawn funds from the foreign affairs account.
Four equally important purposes were mandated for food aid: to serve
foreign policy needs, to promote economic development, to establish overseas
markets for American agricultural products, and to help alleviate hunger
overseas. With regard to the initial regime principles, these purposes implied
that food aid (1) should be provided from the donors' own surplus stocks, (2)
should supplement the usual commercial food imports in recipient countries,
(3) should be given under short-term commitments sensitive to the political and
economic goals of donors, and (4) should directly feed hungry people. This
initial package of principles rested on the theoretical supposition that the levels
of food production-largely wheat production-in certain rich, exporting
states were in excess both of domestic consumption needs and of commercial
export needs. Hence, some stocks could be transferred by "special transactions"
to recipient states in which production and import levels failed to meet
domestic consumption needs. 13
The inaugural legislation combined three long-standing impulses or motivations. The first, a humanitarian one, created a permanent instrument to serve
the commitment to provide food to peoples threatened by famine and
malnutrition. National surpluses, which lower the price of domestic products,
made it politically and economically more attractive to act charitably through
food provisions. The charitable impulse institutionalized by PU80 was not
new, however. In the early twentieth century, for example, the United States,
already a food exporter, provided emergency food aid to China. After each of
the world wars, the United States helped prevent famines in war-devastated
areas. 14 The second motivation for U.S. food aid, one that existed perpetually
12. See Susan B. Epstein, "Food for Peace, 1954-1986: Major Changes in Legislation,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 30 April 1987; Ann-Marie Bairstow, "A
History of United States Food Aid, 1812-1954," U.S. Agency for International Development,
Washington, D.C., August 1988; and Trudy Heskamp Peterson,Agricultural Exports, Farm Income,
and the Eisenhower Administration (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979).
13. John Cathie, The Political Economy of Food Aid (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).
14. Kathleen Ann Cravero, "Food and Politics: Domestic Sources of U.S. Food Aid Policies,
1949-1979," Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, Bronx, N.Y., 1982.
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since World War II, was the use of subsidized transfers of U.S. food to reduce
excess American food stocks. The price support system adopted in the 1930s,
which encouraged expanded production, and the rising price of food in the
world markets during the 1940s, which was reflected domestically, resulted in
large government-held surpluses in the 1950s. 15 Food aid addressed this
problem of surpluses. It subsidized the development of foreign markets for
these goods, thereby protecting U.S. farmers by creating additional demands
and keeping prices from falling. The increase in exports then lowered the cost
of U.S. farm programs involving the government's purchase and storage of
excess food stocks. The third motivation was diplomatic and ideological. The
American interest in sending food to Europe and Japan in the 1950s was based
on concerns not only related to economic recovery but also related to security.
Food aid could support friendly governments and help fight the global battle
against communism.
Thus, American "interests" arising from the Cold War and agricultural
surpluses were combined with liberal humanitarian ideals. Hubert Humphrey,
a prominent liberal U.S. senator in the 1950s, perhaps best characterized the
"climate" among public leaders sponsoring food aid when he argued that
supplying food to other countries could be "a great asset for checking
communist aggression" and offered the following rationale: "Communism has
no greater ally than hunger; and democracy and freedom no greater ally than
an abundance offood." 16
As the subsequent sections of this article make clear, each of the four
original principles of the food aid regime has been challenged and changed,
partly in response to structural factors but also according to prescriptions
arising from a community of development specialists studying food aid. In 1963,
when the WFP was established to coordinate a special portion of food aid, the
aid was to be used by recipient governments in agricultural and other projects
that would help needy people improve their lives. This agency, a joint
undertaking of the UN General Assembly and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), began with less than $100 million to use for emergency
and development projects during a three-year period. By the late 1980s, the
WFP had dramatically increased its regime role. It had become a large
multilateral assistance agency, second only to the World Bank in size, and was
now transferring resources to less developed countries (LDCs) in amounts
exceeding $1 billion annually. It had also become the major arena in which new
norms for all food aid were being articulated. Among the factors that facilitated
the changes in the regime role and norms was a decrease in the prominence of
the United States as a food aid donor in the 1970s, with the result that the
regime became more multilateral.
15. Epstein, "Food for Peace."
16. Hubert Humphrey, testimony before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 16
July 1953, on considerations of S. 2249 authorizing the use of surplus commodities for foreign
assistance; cited by Ruttan in Why Food Aid? p. 1.
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The 1970s and 1980s were marked by numerous behavioral changes in food
aid, five of which involved declines: the U.S. share of world food aid dropped
(see Figure 1); the U.S. share of costs for world food aid dropped; the absolute
tonnage dropped (see Tables 1 and 2); the share of food aid in cereal trade
dropped; and the ratio of food aid to total official development assistance
(ODA) dropped. For example, between 1958 and 1968, the U.S. share of world
food aid was between 90 and 95 percent and averaged nearly 15 million metric
tons, most of which went to a group of ten to fifteen countries. In the 1980s, the
United States reduced its volume share to between 50 and 65 percent, and its
cost share also fell to less than 50 percent of the world's cost for food aid.
Ironically, the total volume of world food aid declined when the burden of
providing it became more widely shared and the cost of food and transport
declined. In addition, while food aid accounted for 15 to 25 percent of grain
trade and represented close to 20 percent of the total ODA in the 1950s, 17 it
accounted for only 5 percent of grain trade and 10 percent of ODA in the
1980s.
As all of these measures of food aid shrank, however, the types of end use
and modalities for delivering food aid grew in complexity and the food regime
expanded in scope. In 1989, about twenty-five countries provided food and over
a hundred received it. The number of recipients reflected the fact that the
number of cases of chronic malnourishment had not declined. Estimates of
those suffering from hunger in the 1980s ranged from 250 million to over a
billion. 18
The overall decline in food aid proved useful in facilitating a shift in regime
goals. Indeed, as food aid proved less important to producer groups, this made
it easier for the regime to abandon surplus disposal as a principal element in
rhetoric about food aid and to focus instead on food security goals aimed at
economic development and the long-term alleviation of hunger. Two other
factors helped account for the shift in goals.
First, in November 1974, following the panic over rising world food prices
during the previous two years, a world food conference was held. The
participants agreed that meeting long-term food security needs should be given
priority and made several decisions regarding WFP leadership and resources,
decisions that facilitated research and networking among food aid specialists.
One of the decisions was to create a new international governing committee,
17. See International Wheat Council (IWC), Rules of Procedure: 1981 Protocol for the First
Extension of the Food Aid Convention, 1980 (London: IWC, 1981); Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Cooperation: 1985 Report (Paris: OECD,
December 1985), pp. 137-56; and OECD, Development Cooperation: 1989 Report (Paris: OECD,
December 1989).
18. See Thomas T. Poleman, "World Hunger: Extent, Causes, and Cures," in Johnson and
Schuh, The Role of Markets in the World Food Economy, pp. 41-89; World Bank, Poverty and Hunger;
Robert Kates, World Hunger Report, 1989 (Providence, RI.: Brown University Press, 1989); and
National Research Council, Food Aid Projections for the Decade of the 1990s (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 1989).
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the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs. The new committee was to
consist of thirty member states and would be responsible for establishing the
principles for food aid, for providing guidance both to donors and to recipients,
and for carrying out the tasks initially mandated to its predecessor body, the
WFP Intergovernmental Committee or "parliament." Since its inception, the
Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs has met twice a year to approve
the two- to five-year food aid projects to be supported by the WFP and to
discuss general principles and norms for all food aid, including that provided
through bilateral agreements and accounting for 75 percent of the world's total
food aid. Another decision made by the conference participants was to
establish special financial bodies to channel investments to farmers involved in
small-scale production. Accordingly, the International Fund for Agriculture
Development was created in 1977.
Second, there was an increase in policy coordination efforts outside the WFP
Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs. In the late 1970s, the World
Bank Consultative Group, which met frequently to coordinate aid to individual
countries, began to discuss and approve food aid in selected cases, such as that
involving Bangladesh. In the 1980s, the European Community (EC) Parliament
met and voted to allow cash to be substituted for food aid when appropriate.
During this same period also, the United States, Canada, and EC members
began to hold semiannual meetings focusing on food aid. This facilitated policy
coordination among the major donors and encouraged them to pursue
complementary policies on a shared goal-that of long-term hunger alleviation.19
While the shift to this goal has been less than complete in the United States,
which has an historical legacy of multiple objectives pursued through food aid,
it has steadily gained momentum. In 1990, it became the central reform
element in legislation to change PIA80, as contained in the Senate farm bill
sponsored by Patrick Leahy and Richard Lugar and in the House version of the
bill supported by Samuel Gejdenson and the Foreign Affairs Committee. The
legislation, which was passed in October 1990 and signed into law in December
1990, calls for limiting "sales" of food to middle-income countries and targeting
grant aid-now the bulk of U.S. food aid-to countries categorized as "food
insecure" on the basis of low caloric intake and income criteria.

Consensual knowledge and the reform agenda
The evolving consensus about the uses of food aid has stemmed from academic
studies and from the experience of officials administering programs in donor
and recipient states. Motivation for change has come principally from a
19. Raymond F. Hopkins, "The Evolution of Food Aid," Food Policy 9 (November 1984),
pp. 345-62.
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FIGURE 1.

Millions of metric tons of cereal provided by the United States and other countries, 1965-66 through 1989-90

Sources. See Tables 1 and 2.

TABLE 1.

Millions of metric tons of cereal provided by principal food aid donors, 1965-66 through 1979-B0•
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Donor
Argentina
Australia
Canada
EC members
Japan
Soviet Union
Sweden
United States
Other countries

Total
U.S. percent of total

1965----66

0.401

na

17.324

17.725
97.7%

1967----68

0.186
0.798

1.714
0.019
13.504

16.221
83.3%

1969-70

1971-72

1973-74

1975-76

0.027
0.216
0.663
1.356
0.395
na
0.038
10.161
0.064

0.013
0.215
1.093
0.978
0.731
na
0.008
9.423
0.266

0.010
0.222
0.664
1.209
0.350
2.200
0.065
3.186
0.335

12.920
78.6%

12.727
74.0%

8.241
38.7%

1977-78

1979-80

0.261
1.034
0.928
0.033
na
0.047
4.273
0.271

0.032
0.252
0.884
1.374
0.135
0.200
0.104
5.988
0.242

0.038
0.315
0.730
1.206
0.688
na
0.098
5.339
0.473

6.847
62.4%

9.211
65.0%

8.887
60.1%

-

'Dash = none or negligible; na = data not available.
Sources. For Canada in 1965----66 and 1967-68, Canadian Department of Agriculture, mimeograph, Ottawa, June 1979. For the United States in 196566, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Agricultural Exports Under Public Law 480 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October
1974), Table 5. For Australia, Soviet Union, and Sweden (wheat only) in 1967-68, International Wheat Council, Record Operations of Member Countries
Under the International Wheat Agreement (London: International Wheat Council, 1978), pp. 15-17. For the United States in 1967-68, U.S. Congress,
American Food Assistance: Report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1976),
p. 34. For all other data, USDA, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1979), p. 73; USDA,
World Food Needs and Availabilities, 1989-90: Summer Update (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1989), p. 18; and United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Food Aid in Figures, 1989, vol. 7 /1 (Rome: FAO, 1990).
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TABLE 2.

Millions of metric tons of cereal provided by principal food aid donors, 1981-82 through 1989-90•

Donor
Argentina
Australia
Canada
EC members
Japan
Soviet Union
Sweden
United States
Other countries

Total
U.S. percent of total

1981-82

1982-83

1983-84

1984-85

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

1989-90

0.020
0.485
Q.600
1.602
0.507

0.033
0.349
0.843
1.596
0.517

0.030
0.460
0.817
1.917
0.445

0.051
0.466
0.943
2.505
0.295

0.024
0.368
1.240
1.884
0.529

0.026
0.328
1.062
2.483
0.547

0.035
0.330
1.000
2.000
0.380

0.030
0.300
0.900
2.000
0.350

na

na

na

na

0.074
7.861
0.599

0.111
7.946
0.657

0.080
5.500
0.432

0.040
5.400
0.380

12.579
62.5%

13.160
60.4%

9.757
56.4%

9.400
57.4%

na

na

na

na

0.119
5.341
0.466

0.087
5.375
0.438

0.083
5.655
0.442

0.088
7.536
0.627

0.044
0.346
1.216
1.614
0.450
0.010
0.069
6.675
0.525

9.140
58.4%

9.238
58.2%

9.849
57.4%

12.511
60.2%

10.949
61.0%

'na = data not avaliable.
Sources. For 1988-89 and 1989-90, figures are estimates based on minimum contributions under the 1986 Food Aid Convention, budgetary allocations,
historical patterns, current food aid policies, and information drawn from a variety of sources. For other years, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1979), p. 73; USDA, World Food Needs andAvailabilities, 1989-90: Swnmer Update (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1989), p. 18; and United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Food Aid in Figures, 1989, vol. 7 /1 (Rome: FAO, 1990).
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development-oriented epistemic community of food aid specialists. Nevertheless, commodity groups, grain traders, farmers, shipping firms, marketing
managers in LDCs, and other interest groups seeking specific economic gains
have also made proposals to shape food aid practices.
Debates between the developmentalists and the interest groups have tended
to focus on the following: the degree to which food aid is considered "special";
the criteria on which allocation of food aid is based; the mode of delivery of
food aid; the extent to which its supply is reliable; the extent to which it has an
adverse (disincentive) effect on food production in recipient countries; and the
types of conditionality that can be reasonably and legitimately associated with
food aid transactions. While some of the arguments for change are based on
lessons learned from past "mistakes," 20 others have arisen in response to a
heightened awareness of circumstances that improve the opportunities for food
aid to have a beneficial impact. The improved supply situation in both donor
and recipient states, for example, opened up a range of possible choices for
change.
While it is clear that an epistemic community of food aid specialists played
an important role in fostering change in international food aid policy, tracing
the membership of the community over a forty-year period and depicting the
contributions of specific members is complicated by the fact that some people's
careers moved them inside the group for a brief time, while other people played
a vital role over their lifetimes. For example, many key officials and respected
academics-such as D. Gale Johnson, University of Chicago economist and
provost-made intellectual contributions, but these have often been sufficiently episodic or redundant to the contributions of other, longer-term
participants that their inclusion in the community is debatable. Another
problem in tracing the community stems from the fact that details of meetings
among and reports issued by development specialists on food aid in the 1950s
and 1960s are less accessible, but these details are perhaps less relevant, since
the major thrust for change in the food aid regime occurred in subsequent
decades.
One of the most prominent early members of the epistemic community,
notable for his many contributions toward making food aid a tool of economic
development, was Hans Singer. Singer assumed a key role in the community
first in the late 1950s while a UN official and continued in later decades to play
a crucial role in food aid reform. 21 His numerous books and hundreds of articles
have served to illuminate the many opportunities for innovation. From his
earliest book, Men Without Work, an investigation of conditions in Germany in
the 1930s, through his 1950 essay entitled "Distribution of Gains Between
20. For an analysis of the impact that memories of past mistakes have on decision making, see
Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse ofHistory in American Foreign Policy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
21. Regarding the key role played by Singer, see Edward Clay and John Shaw, eds., Poverty,
Development, and Food: Essays in Honor of H. W Singer (London: Macmillan, 1987).
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Investing and Borrowing Countries," published in the American Economic
Review, to his 1987 volume reviewing and summarizing the earlier work on food
aid, Singer has consistently sought to integrate food aid into general economic
assistance, to eliminate its negative effects on recipient countries, and to
channel it toward economic development in poor nations. 22 Indeed, virtually all
of the arguments about change in regime principles discussed below have been
articulated at one time or another by Singer.
In the wake of the 1973-74 panic over the world price of food and the
concomitant decrease in food aid, numerous other academics and development
specialists became interested in food aid reform and attended the 1974 world
food conference. It was during this period that Sartaj Aziz, a development
reformer who later became Pakistan's agriculture minister, authored a number
of relevant proposals for changes in the food aid program. It was also during
the 1970s that the literature on food aid and the number of forums for
publishing ideas on the subject grew. For example, Food Policy, a journal
conceived in 1976, began to carry articles by epistemic community members
and even devoted two special issues to the subject of food aid.
By the 1980s, as grain stocks increased, the impetus for reform faded and
fewer academic studies on food aid were undertaken. Nevertheless, by this
time, a reasonably stable group of specialists from various countries had
already formed. Many of these specialists came together in 1983 at the Hague
for a seminar on food aid, which was sponsored by the Dutch government and
the WFP and addressed virtually all of the major issues. Table 3 lists the
participants, many of whom were active community members before the
seminar and have remained active since.
While most of the mainstream neoclassical economists viewed food aid as a
third-rate and undesirable resource that could only undermine rural agriculture and slowly increase the impoverishment of the poor, the members of the
epistemic community continued to defend their view that food aid would work
if the underlying principles and practices of the regime were appropriately
reformed. Joining Singer in his efforts to ensure that food aid would be
reformed rather than abandoned were several other economists, including
John Mellor, former chief economist of the Agency for International Aid
(AID) and head of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI);
Shlomo Reutlinger, an economist at the World Bank; G. Edward Schuh,
former undersecretary of international affairs and commodities for the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and dean of the Hubert Humphrey
Institute of Public Affairs; and Joachim Von Braun, an agricultural economist
who studied food aid and economic development for the German government
and joined IFPRI in 1985.
22. See Hans Singer, Men Without Work (London: P. S. King & Son, 1940); Hans Singer,
"Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries," American Economic Review
40 (May 1950), pp. 473-85; and Hans Singer, John Wood, and Tony Jennings, Food Aid: The
Challenge and the Opportunity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
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TABLE 3.

Participants in the 1983 Hague seminar

Name

Country

Aseffa Abreha
Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad
Tanwir Ahmad

Ethiopia
Bangladesh
Pakistan

Maurice Bertrand'
Anneliese Binder'

France
Switzerland

Julia Chang Bloch'
Michael Cracknell

United States
France

John Crawford
Ruth Dixon
Saravanamuthu Easparathasan
Michael N. Gifford
Richard Harley'

Australia
United States
Sri Lanka
Canada
United States

Fabian G. Holder'
Raymond F. Hopkins'
James D. Ingram'
Nural Islam'

Jamaica
United States
Australia
Bangladesh

Philip Johnston'

United States

Richard Jolly'

Britain

Hans J. Kristensen
Jane Kusin
John W. Mellor'

Denmark
Netherlands
United States

Larry Minear'

United States

Charles Paolillo
Jean H. Parotte
Lawrence Pezzullo
Shlomo Reutlinger'
G. Edward Schuh'
Amartya Sen'
John Shaw'
Hans Singer'
Tarlok Singh
Jan Sonneveld

United States
Britain
United States
United States
United States
India
Britain
Britain
India
Netherlands

Wouter Tims'
Tomas Uribe Mosquera'
J. J. A. M. Van Gennip
Francois Van Hoek

Netherlands
Colombia
Netherlands
Netherlands

Brian W. Walker'
Maurice J. Williams'

Britain
United States

Affiliation

Ministry of Agriculture
Institute of Development Studies, Dhaka
Office of the Ambassador to Food Agencies,
Rome
Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations, Geneva
Food Security Unit, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Agency for International Aid (AID)
International Federation of Agricultural Producers, Paris
Australian National University
University of California, Davis
Central Bank of Ceylon
Directorate of Agriculture, Canada
Harvard Institute for International Development
World Food Programme, Rome
Swarthmore College
World Food Programme, Rome
Office of Economic and Social Policy, FAO,
Rome
Cooperative for American Relief to Everywhere (CARE), New York
United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), New York
Ministry of Agriculture
University of Amsterdam
International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI)
Church World Service and Lutheran World
Relief
World Food Programme, Rome
International Wheat Council, London
Catholic Relief Services
World Bank
University of Minnesota
Oxford and Harvard Universities
World Food Programme, Rome
University of Sussex
Indian Council of World Affairs
Office of the Dutch Representative to the
FAO,Rome
Free University, Amsterdam
Banco de! Estado, Bogota
EuronAid, The Hague
Commission of the European Community,
Brussels
Oxfam, Oxford
World Food Council, Rome

'Participants who have published five or more articles, books, reports, or essays on food aid.
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Several other people who were interested in reform at the time of the Hague
seminar and have become increasingly active should also be considered
members of the epistemic community. Among them are Hannon Ezekiel, who
headed the food aid division of IFPRI in the early 1980s; Walter Falcon of
Stanford University; Roger Hay, head of the food studies group at Oxford
University; Barbara Huddleston, chief of food security at the FAO; Simon
Maxwell and Edward Clay, proteges of Singer at Sussex University; Robert
Paarlberg of Wellesley College; Hartmut Schneider of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Peter Timmer of Harvard
University; and Kees Tuinenberg, a Dutch researcher at the WFP and World
Bank. 23
Each of these community members has written articles, proposed reforms in
food aid, and consulted with universities or government bodies such as the
FAO, WFP, World Bank, and bilateral agencies. While the development
experts have their training in a wide variety of disciplines, including economics,
other social sciences, and agricultural sciences, they share the same criteria for
evaluating the validity of scientific evidence. They read each other's work; meet
at workshops several times a year; participate in forums such as the Hunger
Exchange, which has been held annually at Brown University since 1988; and
work together on advisory boards and in ad hoc working groups, such as the
1978 group that reviewed PL480 and the 1988-89 group that advised the World
Bank on food security issues. All of these activities keep the community
members in regular face-to-face contact with one another. While they do not
necessarily agree on the specific details and the scope of reform to be
advocated, they all agree that food aid could and should be used benignly for
development, and they all agree on a policy project aimed at the long-term
alleviation of hunger. On the basis of this agreement on goals, the epistemic
community discussed in this article can be distinguished from another
"epistemic community" that also emerged-a more critical, leftist community
which advocated abolishing all but emergency food aid and which was strongly
influenced by the ideas of Susan George, Tony Jackson, Frances Moore Lappe,
and Emma Rothschild. 24

23. This list excludes a number of contributors to the food aid literature, both in government and
in academia, who are debatably members of the epistemic community. For example, Mitchel
Wallerstein, now at the National Academy of Science, is the author of an influential volume, Food
for War: Food for Peace.
24. For examples of important works written by the radical critics of food aid, see Susan George,
How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reason for World Hunger (New York: Penguin Books, 1976);
Tony Jackson, Against the Grain: The Dilemma of Project Food Aid (Oxford: Oxfam, 1982); Frances
Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, with Cary Fowler, Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977); and Emma Rothschild, "Is It Time to End Food for Peace?"
New York Times Magazine, 13 March 1977, pp. 15-48. In the magazine Food Monitor, which
flourished for a decade following the 1974 world food conference, and in a variety of professional
and institutional (usually church-related) journals, food aid was also broadly condemned as an
insidious and misleading "gift" to the poor.
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At the broadest level, the rationale for giving priority to food security goals
rests on a growing consensus among development experts that population
growth, food needs, and pressures on the environment are linked. 25 The nature
of the linkages has been a subject of increasing investigation, especially in
developing countries where food and population problems dominate "security"
concerns. 26 While each national context presents a particular pattern of
relationships and varying degrees of concern for negative external consequences, the scientific community has concluded that a serious global threatone of growing proportion-is arising from the rapid growth of populations in
developing countries and the stagnant or declining standards of living faced by
those populations. 27 One consequence of the increase in population and
concomitant increase in demands for food is that the developing countries are
not only intensifying the use of land for agricultural production but also placing
more and more land of marginal value into production. In short, they are
pursuing agronomic practices which are not ecologically stable and which
cannot provide them with long-term food security. 28 The most enduring
challenges to the four original principles governing food aid have come from
this concern.
The principle of using donor surpluses for food aid has been challenged on
two counts related to inefficiencies and even negative effects stemming from
the practice. On the one hand, relying on surpluses has led to procyclical food
aid-that is, recipient countries receiving lower levels of food when they most
need it. This exacerbates the problems related to hunger. On the other hand,
having permanent surpluses is a bad policy. In the United States during the
1950s and 1960s, domestic interests did not support the policy of having
farmers grow food for food aid, and U.S. officials opposed policies creating
permanent surpluses. Indeed, beginning in the 1960s, the United States,
Australia, Canada, and some other countries adopted acreage reduction
policies to end surpluses. These policies in turn weakened the interests of
commodity producers and their legislative representatives in supporting food
aid. As U.S. hegemony declined, burden sharing among industrialized states
was promoted by the United States and other grain exporters. The creation of
the WFP in 1963 and the call for a food aid convention in 1967 were responses
to the notion that the rich importing nations of Europe and Japan should also
25. See Bruce F. Johnston and John W. Mellor, "The World Food Equation: Interrelations
Between Development, Employment and Food Consumption," Journal of Economic Literature 22
(June 1984), pp. 521-74.
26. The World Bank's Development Report, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, forthcoming)
seeks to pull together much of the research on the nature of these linkages.
27. See Lester Brown, "State of the World, 1988," paper no. 65, World Watch, Washington,
D.C., 1988.
28. For arguments supporting this link, see the contributions in John W. Mellor, ed., "Food
Policy, Food Aid and Structural Adjustment Programmes: The Context of Agricultural
Development," special issue of Food Policy, vol. 13, February 1988. Many experts have explored
this link, as have the leaders of various organizations. For example, Philip Johnson, executive
director of the Cooperative for American Relief to Everywhere (CARE), discussed it in his speech
in Minneapolis in November 1988.
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support food aid. Concerns about the reliability of food aid provided through
disposal of surpluses reached their peak in 1972-74, when U.S. aid fell from 12
million to 3 million metric tons.
Another problem with providing food aid through the surplus disposal
principle was the inefficiency involved in resource transfer. The choice of
commodities to be transferred was based on the donor's need to dispose of
specific surpluses, often bulky ones in particular, rather than on the recipient's
need for specific foodstuffs. To counter this, Shlomo Reutlinger, a World Bank
economist, proposed the use of an "alpha coefficient." The idea was that the
choice of commodities to be involved in a particular project should be based on
maximizing the value of the transferred commodity by taking into account both
the shipping costs accruing to the donor and the ease with which the people in
the recipient country could market the donated commodity and then buy
needed household goods from local producers. For example, oil and milk
powder were commodities that cost relatively less to ship and were more easily
bartered than were bulky grains. Similarly, milk power was less costly for the
donor to produce and easier for the recipient to market than were expensive
products made from a blend of corn, soy, and milk. Although Reutlinger's
proposal caused considerable consternation among producers of highly processed food aid commodities and among some nutritionists, who feared that
specialized commodities targeted for women and infants would be neglected,
the basic principle of maximizing the value of the resource transfer has become
increasingly accepted among food aid specialists. Despite the fact that the
principle has not yet been mandated by legislation, it has become widely used in
the design of projects by the WFP, AID, the Canadian International Development Agency, and other development organizations. In the mid-1980s, for
example, oil was chosen as the commodity to be shipped to Rwanda because it
could be easily exchanged on the market and used in support of various
activities that would enhance long-term local agricultural production.
The second wave of criticism attacked the principle of additionality.
According to this principle, mandated both by legislation and by the creation of
a FAO committee to monitor food aid, food provided through this "special"
channel (the term used by the International Wheat Council) should be
considered an addition to, rather than a substitute for, the recipient's regular
commercial imports. As development objectives came increasingly to the fore
and as desperately poor recipients, such as those in Bangladesh in 1974, came
to be favored, the rationale for additionality weakened. Critics argued that
food aid should allow recipient countries to reduce their imports and use the
savings to invest in development projects. They also argued that food aid over
and above the regular commercial imports had the adverse effect of lowering
prices paid to local producers and thereby discouraging them from producing.
This criticism, derived from basic supply and demand assumptions, forced food
aid managers and supporters to seek devices to prevent the "disincentive"
effect. Some have argued, however, that the best solution would be to abandon
the additionality principle in favor of a pure substitutability principle, since the
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disincentive effect via its market effect would vanish-a point in which food aid
defenders have increasingly taken comfort. 29
The disincentive criticism, in fact, has been the most frequently debated
issue in the epistemic community. Beginning in the 1950s, leading economists,
including Theodore Schultz of the University of Chicago (subsequently a Nobel
prize winner) and Mordecai Ezekiel of the F AO, argued that using surpluses as
food aid was likely to have a negative impact on farmers in recipient countries
and would also undercut economic development in those countries.Jo Two
decades later, Susan George, Frances Moore Lappe, Joseph Collins, and other
proponents of socialist autarkic development made similar criticisms and
concluded that the use of surpluses would harm local producers, undermine
local production, distort world efficiency, and deepen the dependency of poor
states on the world's capitalist trading systems.J 1 In the 1970s, this view
emerged as the dominant view of the epistemic community.
One solution to the problem was to create a multilateral agency that would
be responsible for targeting food aid toward development projects and would
thus avoid the criticisms for which bilateral programs were particularly
susceptible. In 1960, when Singer was acting as key adviser to Dag Hammarskjold, he had proposed that such an international body be created. This
proposal had then come under discussion at the F AO in Rome and had been
taken up by George McGovern, who headed the Food for Peace program based
in the White House during the Kennedy presidency. In a letter to Eugene
Black, then president of the World Bank, Hammarskjold had proposed that the
World Bank establish a separate management division to undertake multilateral food aid. At that time, however, mainstream economists viewed food aid as
an unreliable, expensive, and distorting form of international transfer and one
which the World Bank would be wise not to dirty its hands. Black consequently
declined Hammarskjold's proposal. Singer and other members of the epistemic
community thus began pushing for an independent multilateral food agency.
Among those joining them in promoting this were Frank Shefrin, a senior
official in Agriculture Canada, B. R. Sen, an economist who was directorgeneral of the FAO, and McGovern. An international "working group" of the
UN agreed on the provisional step of creating the WFP, a multilateral agency
to be headquartered in Rome and closely linked with the FAO.
For the development-oriented epistemic community, shifting food aid to a
multilateral body was but a first step toward addressing the broad criticisms
regarding disincentives. A second step was to target U.S. and European food

29. See Christopher Stevens, Food Aid and the Developing World: Four Case Studies (London:
Croom, Helm, 1979); and Singer, Wood, and Jennings, Food Aid.
30. See Theodore W. Schultz, "Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries,"
Journal of Farm Economics 42 (December 1960), pp. 1019-30; and Mordecai Ezekiel, "Apparent
Results in Using Surplus Food for Financing Economic Development," Journal ofFarm Economics
40 (November 1958), pp. 915-23.
31. See George, How the Other Half Dies; and Lappe and Collins, Food First.
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aid toward countries with large numbers of undernourished people. In the
early 1970s, the U.S. Congress began reconsidering the concessional sales part
of U.S. food aid, which had previously been used to support Israel, Portugal,
South Vietnam, and other military-political allies. In 1974, the Congress passed
legislation requiring that at least 75 percent of the concessional sales be
allocated to countries that fell below a specified poverty level. In subsequent
years, this level was set as the level at which countries would be eligible for
"soft" loans (long-term, low-interest financing) from the World Bank. At the
same time, Singer, who had moved to the Institute for Development Studies at
Sussex, and several other European academics, especially academics from
Germany, began criticizing the EC food aid program for aiding Malta, former
French colonies, and other special clients whose income levels were well above
that of countries in heavy need. By the mid-1980s, the EC adopted an official
policy of targeting the least developed and most food-deficient states, many of
which were former British and French colonies.
A third step in shifting the regime principles toward development goals
occurred through legislation directed at preventing disincentive effects in
recipient countries. In 1979, for example, the U.S. Congress adopted the
Bellman amendment to PL480. According to this amendment, the secretary of
agriculture was required to certify in each case that giving food aid to a country
would not disrupt its markets or act as a disincentive to local production. At
about the same time, the WFP Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs
in Rome began to require similar assurances before the WFP would approve
food aid to any country.
Thus, by the late 1970s, the idea that disincentive effects could be and must
be prevented had gained the consensus of food aid advocates and critics alike
and had become internalized by officials managing the food aid programs in the
major donor countries and the WFP. As a result of the institutionalization of
this idea, disincentive effects were now hard to find. As noted by Vernon
Ruttan, an agricultural economist with extensive experience in international
development, "The major impact of the professional literature on food aid has
been to narrow the range of controversy about food aid impact. It is difficult for
anyone who has limited familiarity with the literature to continue to argue that
food aid has a pervasive negative impact on the growth of agricultural
production. ,m
In addition to criticizing the first two principles of food aid, those of surplus
use and additionality, the epistemic community also criticized the third
principle, that of short-term commitments based on the economic and political
goals of donors. This third principle made food aid unreliable as a resource for
multiyear projects and for aid linked to policy reform. This shortcoming was
evident, for example, in the case of U.S. aid to India. In the mid-1960s, the
32. Vernon W. Ruttan, "Food Aid: Surplus Disposal, Strategic Assistance, Development Aid
and Basic Needs," mimeograph, University of Minnesota, October 1989, p. 60.
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Johnson administration approved the provision of aid to India for only three
months at a time. These "short-tether" tactics infuriated the Indians, who
needed reliable imports of food during shortages stemming from the lack of
monsoon rains during a two-year period. 33 Similar problems encountered by
other countries prompted epistemic community members to advocate reform
addressing the issues of how long food aid would be available and which
countries would be targeted for aid. The results of reforms in response these
criticisms are reflected in Table 4, which shows a dramatic change in the
pattern of food aid over time. The decline of the politically motivated food aid
tied to alliance fidelity with donors is evident in the fact that food aid to Korea
and Turkey was drastically cut in the mid-1970s. This decline was accompanied
by an increase in allocations to Bangladesh and African nations, which have
offered the major donors relatively marginal political and economic assistance.
While low-income, food-deficit countries received only about 50 percent of the
food aid in the early 1970s, they received nearly 90 percent in the late 1980s.
Criticism over the fourth principle of food aid-that of directly feeding
hungry people-has been the most muted and cautiously worded. Who, after
all, would deny food to starving infants? The general thrust of the criticism
against delivering food directly to individuals is this: given that the resources
available for food aid projects are limited, then the aid must be efficiently used
for development ends and not expended for consumption uses, since the latter
may even reduce pressure on governments to address rural development and
long-term food security goals. 34 Other than in cases of dire emergency,
delivering food directly to the hungry is a suspect principle for several reasons.
The costs of transporting food can be excessively high, amounting to 100 to 200
percent of the cost of the food itself in projects involving African countries. 35
Even if the amount of food in a given aid project is small on a national scale, it
can disrupt local food systems. Moreover, sending food for direct distribution
to the people may reinforce excessively expensive subsidy programs, as
occurred in Egypt and Sri Lanka in the 1970s, or may create administrative
nightmares, as was the case in Zaire. 36

33. See James W. Bjorkman, "Public Law 480 and the Policies of Self-Help and Short Tether:
Indo-American Relations, 1965-68," in Report of the Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), appendix 3; and Robert L. Paarlberg, Food Trade and Foreign Policy: India, the Soviet Union
and the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
34. Johnston and Mellor, "The World Food Equation."
35. Maurice J. Williams, "The African Food Problem and the Role of International Agencies:
Report by the Executive Director," World Food Council, Rome, 8 March 1982.
36. See C. Peter Timmer and Matthew Guerreiro, "Food Aid and Development Policy," paper
presented at the Agricultural Development Council/Research and Training Network Conference,
Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 1980; Joachim Von Braun and Hartwig de Haen, "Impact of Food
Price and Subsidy Policies on the Agricultural Sector: Egypt," mimeograph, Ministry of
Agriculture of Egypt, USDA and AID, Washington, D.C., July 1982; U.S. General Accounting
Office, "Search for Options in the Troubled Food-for-Peace Program in Zaire," mimeograph,
Washington, D.C., 22 February 1979; and Murdoch, The Poverty of Nations.
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TABLE 4. Thousands of metric tons of cereal allocated to major food aid
recipients, 1966-67 through 1990-91"

Recipient
Africa
Angola
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Mozambique
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Zaire
Zambia
Asia
Bangladesh
China
India
Indonesia
Kampuchea
Korea
Pakistan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Vietnam
Latin America
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
El Salvador
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Peru
Middle East
Algeria
Egypt
Israel
Morocco
Tunisia
Turkey

1966--67

1970-71

1975-76

1980--81

1985--86

1990-91

24.8
228.0
94.3
172.9
16.6
154.6
152.7
330.1
194.5
235.8
77.0
84.4

52.5
799.2
96.4
139.4
5.1
261.7
117.5
142.9
939.1
65.8
101.0
84.6

156.7
911.6
89.2
108.1
251.8
669.4
34.5
130.3
403.5
16.0
102.1
6.0

1,300.3
290.2
257.4
50.2
34.3

1,137.5
148.0
468.3
79.4
11.2

383.8
181.0
365.5
16.7

102.2
213.6
283.8
105.2

292.5

304.8
9.7
10.9
100.3
168.1
177.9
222.1
350.0
98.3
308.2
57.2
1,263.3
40.5
306.1
445.8
2.8

3.0
20.9
2.6
0.1

3.4
97.7
2.5
0.5

24.0
0.5
0.1
7.9

15.8
2.3
28.0
8.8
16.7
0.2

6.0
86.6
32.0
8.7
0.2
57.5
16.1
55.1
24.8
108.7
19.9
5.3

610.0

1,186.9

5.2
1,169.2
13.8
17.7
22.2
95.6
18.2
14.6
1.6

2,384.2
1,154.5
10.6
1,882.0
1,004.0
42.5
215.6
631.5

1,107.8
136.5
344.2
788.9
61.9
129.1
32.9

736.9
37.0
435.3
381.7
133.0
678.2
276.8
84.6
226.2
150.4

3.7
60.1
20.1
22.9
7.1
2.5
4.0

8.5
433.8
19.1
143.5
4.7
2.0
5.7

8.0
3.0
351.3
26.0
4.0
13.4
6.4

54.7
3.0
21.3
5.4
49.5
35.8
37.2

2.0
8.6

0.9
118.0

3.1
28.7

58.3
115.9

10.3
5.7
278.1
135.0
202.5
10.8
40.6
180.2

104.8
56.7
2.6
53.6
13.3
18.5

158.3
253.7
807.2
334.5
254.3
757.7

16.3
1,085.5
98.1
37.1
60.8
7.0

28.5
1,864.9
9.8
120.4
98.8
9.1

3.6
1,798.7
8.4
142.3
79.7
5.7

5.5

'Dash = none or negligible.
Sources. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Food Aid in Figures (Rome: FAO, 1983,
1985, 1989, and April 1991); U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service,Annual Report on PL480 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966); and Food
Aid Centre, Canadian Industrial Development Agency, mimeograph, Ottawa, 1984.

This content downloaded from
130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:01:59 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

246

International Organization

The research by Roger Hay of Oxford University and Simon Maxwell of
Sussex University underscores the difficulties that direct delivery of food
presents. 37 In many cases, refugees have been provided free food while people
who are equally poor and live in nearby locales have been forced to pay for it. In
other cases, existing work projects using food as an incentive or payment have
been forced to compete with refugee camps providing free food. Once a
program involving the direct delivery of food has been established, it is difficult
to "wean" people from it. As a result of these findings, a concerted effort was
made to allow the food provided by food aid programs to be sold whenever
possible. The rationale was not to make desperate people even more desperate
but, rather, to create equity and a sense of quid pro quo for recipients and to
blend the emergency intervention into a longer-term framework for economic
development within the recipient country.
The older regime principles, still imbedded in parts of U.S. legislation,
sometimes have made it difficult to follow goals based on this newer rationale.
This occurred, for example, in the case of food being sent from the United
States under the auspices of a voluntary organization, the Cooperative for
American Relief to Everywhere (CARE), to the Diradawa region of Ethiopia.
In 1987, CARE officials in Ethiopia felt that the recipients of the emergency
food supplies were ready to be moved toward a program that would exchange
labor for food and might eventually return the people to their homes with some
resources and thereby allow them to resume their previous occupations, which
largely centered on farming. To accomplish this transition, CARE was forced
to turn to the EC for food aid, since U.S. legislation prevented the "emergency"
supplies to be used in a "sales" manner. Food aid experts in Ethiopia and
elsewhere have applauded the idea of food-for-work as a transition from
emergencies and have applied it in a number of cases. Indeed, reports of these
cases have circulated widely among the development agencies and officials
responsible for food aid transfers.
Epistemic community members have raised other questions regarding the
role of the fourth principle. It presumes, as an allocation rationale, that feeding
the hungry is an end goal. Then should not allocations be based on the
recipients' nutritional needs rather than on the donors' diplomatic or market
development goals? The principles of surplus disposal and additionality were
linked with trade-based motivations, as discussed earlier, and these motivations were not always consistent with giving top priority to the food needs of
recipients. Thus, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the FAO, IFPRI, and other
organizations began to analyze the food needs of various recipients. In their
studies, they assessed not only the recipients' transitory and short-term needs,
such as those arising from crop failures in a particular year, but also their

37. See Roger W. Hay, "Criteria for the Provision of Emergency Food Aid," document
CFA/21/10, addition 1, WFP, Rome, March 1986; and Simon Maxwell, "European Food Aid: Not
Just for Emergencies," in CAP Briefing (Brussels), nos. 1-3, October 1987.
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persistent and long-term "structural" needs, such as those linked with chronic
and widespread nutritional deficiencies. Beginning in 1981, pursuant to
congressional urging, the Economic Research Service of the USDA also began
to compile assessments of food needs and publish them regularly in their World
Food Needs and Availabilities. As a result of these studies, the nutrition-based
needs of recipients have gained salience in the allocation decisions of most
donors. 38
While the overall trend in recent years has been to shift allocations of food
aid toward food-insecure countries, the distribution of food aid nevertheless
remains skewed. Moreover, the volume of food distributed remains well below
the absolute needs of recipients. To illustrate these points, Table 5 shows the
actual allocation of food aid to selected countries in 1988-89 and compares it
with an alternative allocation based on nutritional needs. If the distribution of
food aid had been based solely on the nutritional needs of the recipients, rather
than being based in part on the political and other motivations of the donors,
then less of the allotted ten million metric tons of cereal would have gone to
Latin America and the Middle East and far more would have gone to Africa
and Asia. 39 In short, if food security were the top priority, more food would be
channeled to the countries with the greatest nutritional needs, countries whose
food insecurity is often linked with declining agricultural productivity, increasing deforestation, and high population growth.
The criticisms outlined in this section have for the most part emanated from
the epistemic community and have given rise to an evolutionary change in the
food aid regime. New principles, which largely contradict the founding ones
and which reflect market efficiency and development goals rather than
exceptionalism and diplomatic gains, have emerged. According to these new
principles, food aid (1) should be supplied in the most efficient manner
possible, (2) should be a substitute for the usual commercial food imports in
recipient countries, (3) should be given under long-term commitments, and (4)
should serve as the basis for the recipients' economic development aimed at
addressing long-term food security problems, rather than merely serving as a
vehicle to alleviate immediate food shortages.
In recent decades, these new principles have become embedded in the
institutional practices of multilateral agencies, particularly the WFP, and of
bilateral agencies as well. In some cases, such as that involving the supply of

38. See National Research Council, Food Aid Projections for the Decade of the 1990s. While
academic-congressional coalitions in the United States pushed for the recognition of the
nutrition-based needs of recipients and had a strong impact on the allocation decisions made by
policymakers, the Black Caucus and other special interest groups did relatively little lobbying and
cannot be credited with bringing about reform in the process of allocating aid. Even during the
1984-85 food shortages in Africa, Americans of African origin played no special role in mobilizing
support.
39. See Raymond F. Hopkins, "Increasing Food Aid: Prospects for the 1990s," Food Policy 15
(August 1990), pp. 319-27.
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TABLE 5. Thousands of metric tons of cereal imported by and allocated to
selected food-insecure countries, 1988-89: a comparison of the actual pattern of
food aid (FA) allocation and an alternative pattern based on nutritional estimates
of need•

Recipient

Total
imports

FA as a
percentage
of imports

Actual
FA
allocation

Alternative FA
allocation
forneedb

Changes

7,513
319
452
211
295
506
626
246
609
378
139

40
36
100
42
42
100
11
72
67
34
81

3,011
116
452
88
123
506
67
176
410
127
112

3,844
107
950
127
398
551
57
135
187
127
78

+833
-9
+498
+39
+275
+45
-10
-41
-223

Middle East
Egypt
Morocco

10,197
8,730
1,467

15
14
20

1,488
1,192
295

775
536

-713
-656
-295

Asia
Bangladesh
China
India
Indonesia
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Vietnam

28,595
2,138
15,973
2,627
1,570
1,337
1,186
425

11
63
1
12
12
23
23
27

3,176
1,356
235
322
182
307
278
114

4,464
1,598

+1,288
+242

1,692
144
264

+1,370
-182
-163
-14

1,842
253
632
214
201
151

76
58
100
77
100

1,391
147
349
214
154
151

837
175
85
70
96
11

-554
+28
-264
-144
-58
-140

249
48,396

na
19

978
9,066

124
10,044

+124
+978

117,000

9

10,044

10,044

0

Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Mozambique
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Zaire
Zambia

Latin America
Bolivia
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Others
Total, low-income, foodinsecure states
Total world figures, developing countries

55

-34

'Food-insecure countries encompassed here are designated in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) terminology as "low-income, food-deficit countries." Dash = none or negligible;
na = data not available.
hThe alternative FA volumes were calculated using figures from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), World Food Needs and Availabilities (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, Winter 1989), p. 4. The figures assume an identical amount of total aid (10,044) but reallocated according to the nutrition-based estimates done of "assessed additional cereal needs" by
the USDA Economic Research Service.
Source. FAO, Commodities and Trade Division, Food Outlook (Rome: FAO, February 1990),
pp. 2 and 39-40.
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nonsurplus food, specific new practices have evolved but have not received
much publicity. This was true, for example, of the new practice of making
"triangular" transactions, with food for a recipient country purchased from
producers in neighboring countries. In other cases, as with the case of
long-term commitments, a new principle has been publicly advocated by food
aid specialists based on expert consensus but has met with resistance from
national government budgetary authorities, diplomats, or commodity lobbyists.
Nevertheless, once shifts in food aid practices and principles have occurred,
they have been largely irreversible.
While the shifts in practices and principles took place most rapidly after the
panic over food shortages in the early 1970s, their impact continued to be felt
even when world surpluses grew in the following years. In spite of pressures to
lower surpluses in the United States, Canada, and European countries in the
1980s, for example, regression equations indicate that food aid practices were
less motivated by the goal of disposing surpluses than they had been in earlier
periods. 40 Although surpluses have declined since 1988 and the general
direction of liberalizing domestic trade policies is likely to continue with
prodding from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), all
trading countries negotiating surplus reductions in the GATT forum now agree
that food aid should be delinked from trade promotion.41
Some shifts in principles have been accompanied and facilitated by the
growth in the number of food aid donors. When Germany, Japan, and other
countries that were not food exporters became donors of food aid in the 1970s,
the food-exporting countries that were already donors felt less pressure to
continue the practice of surplus disposal, a practice that was no longer efficient
and was soon to be replaced by explicit export subsidy programs. While
countries such as India, Thailand, and Zimbabwe were clearly too poor to
donate food to neighboring countries in need, they could be involved in the
food aid program through triangular transactions. For example, one African
country could be paid by Japan, Germany, or another rich nation to supply food
to a nearby African country targeted for aid. Triangular aid programs of this
type can be extremely helpful, as development specialists have noted, 42 since
they provide cash to and encourage development in the country producing the
food, they strengthen regional markets, and they deliver food at a lower
transport cost to the designated recipient. Even the United States, the premier
food-exporting nation, has entered into triangular supply arrangements,

40. Shahla Shapouri and Margaret Missiaen, "Food Aid: Motivation and Allocation Criteria,"
Foreign Agricultural Economic Report no. 240, USDA Economic Research Service, Washington,
D.C., February 1990, pp. 18-22.
41. Even the U.S. representatives involved in the GATT negotiations have expressed their
concern and argued that only "bona fide" food aid should be allowed under a GATT agreement.
42. See, for example, Edward Clay, "Triangular Transactions," mimeograph, WFP, Rome,
1987; and D. John Shaw, "Triangular Transactions in Food Aid: Concept and Practice-The
Example of the Zimbabwe Operations," IDA Bulletin (bulletin of the Institute of Development
Studies, University of Sussex), vol. 14, April 1983, pp. 29-31.
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shipping wheat to Zimbabwe so that Zimbabwe could in turn supply white
maize to Zambia as food aid.
In general, as food aid has become a smaller part of world grain trade,
concerns about its market-distorting effects have also declined. The practice of
substituting food aid for commercial imports is now viewed as a logical means
to offset market disincentive effects and is also widely upheld whenever food
aid is justified as a means to support the balance of payments in recipient
countries. In such cases, the conflict between the principle of substitutability
and that of additionality is largely ignored. As a result, the FAO Committee on
Surplus Disposal, which was created in 1954 to ensure that food aid would not
displace commercial sales, has for the most part become superfluous. Nevertheless, as long as both principles exist as legitimating forces within the food aid
regime, efforts will continue to be made to satisfy one or the other, or,
occasionally and inconsistently, both.
As the economic development of recipient countries gained priority, food aid
specialists recommended that a multiyear approach be adopted as a way to lend
greater stability to development undertakings and to make food aid more
readily integrated with financial aid. The importance of such integration was in
fact emphasized by the World Bank in a report coauthored with the WFP. 43
Indeed, the World Bank has begun efforts to develop a framework for
cofinancing among donors, with some providing cash and others providing food
resources for longer-term development projects. Japan and other significant
donors that are not food exporters have shown their willingness to become
involved in financing projects when these projects are not competitive with
their own domestic industries. 44 Similarly, in the United States, Canada, and
the EC, budgeting and planning processes have begun to reinforce the
tendency to integrate food aid with regular financial aid flows. While budget
officials have opposed formally committing their governments to food aid for
more than a year at a time, their budgets for foreign aid now combine cash and
food resources over a several-year planning horizon.
The principles that the epistemic community of scholars and practitioners
have worked out since the 1960s also stress four factors that have an impact on
the outcome of providing food aid. First, whether or not food aid is a substitute
for or an addition to domestic production, policies affecting investment and
efficiency in food production will have an impact on disincentive effects. If
disincentives can be avoided, this in turn will lessen future needs. Second,
macroeconomic and food sector policies affecting prices and incentives are
important in the allocation of food aid, since the aid can reinforce or undercut
these policies. Third, future food availability and future production will be
affected less by market-driven prices than by the targeted or general food
subsidies and the cost effectiveness of such subsidies offered by recipient
43. World Bank and WFP, "Food Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa."
44. See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1989).
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governments. And, fourth, the nutritional and health-related needs of specific
recipients will be affected by the choice of commodities provided as food aid
and the efficiency of resource transfer strategies. Choosing commodities on the
basis of recipient needs and efficient transfer, rather than on the basis of donor
needs to dispose of surplus commodities, such as dates from Saudi Arabia or
fish from Norway, will have a more positive impact on recipient countries and
will reduce their future needs for food aid.

Four historical case episodes
In this section, I review four episodes of reform in the food aid regime, each
concerning an issue discussed briefly above: the issues of disincentives, the
efficiency of resource transfers, the criteria for allocation, and the conditionality of food aid. In tracing the origins of reform in these areas, I begin in 1958,
when the Senate committee headed by Hubert Humphrey held hearings on the
idea of changing PL480 into a "food-for-peace program." I focus in particular
on the ways in which the new information that was generated and disseminated
by members of the food aid epistemic community helped bring about reforms.
In each of the "cases" discussed here, reforms of existing food aid practices
occurred incrementally and with occasional setbacks. It was generally during
periods when narrow interest-based forces were receding that epistemic
community members encountered success in their efforts to shift the specific
rules and practices of the regime in a direction that would accomplish their goal
of enhancing global equity through development in the poorest states and
thereby maximizing global economic development. The members of the
community were not oblivious to the domestic political factors that provided
donor countries with an incentive or rationale for supporting food aid
programs, perhaps even increasing the amount of aid that would otherwise
have been available to recipients. Consequently, the main concern of the
community was not to enlarge food aid budgets but, rather, to distribute the
available food aid efficiently and wisely and with humanitarian concerns in
mind.

Disincentives
The disincentives argument set forth by Mordecai Ezekiel in 1958 and
Theodore Schultz in 1960 created a skepticism about food aid that has lingered
for years. 45 According to this argument, because demand is less elastic in
developing countries that in developed countries, even a small change in the

45. See Ezekiel, "Apparent Results in Using Surplus Food for Financing Economic
Development"; and Schultz, "Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries."
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supply of food to developing countries could cause food prices to fall
substantially, thereby reducing the incentive of local producers to continue
their agricultural production. Domestic production might even decline to the
point at which the total amount of food (the volume of aid shipments plus
domestic products) would be less than if no food aid were given. This argument
was frequently incorporated in introductory economic courses not only in the
United States and other developed countries but throughout the world. As a
result, thousands of academics became saturated with the argument in its
primitive form.
In the wake of criticisms stemming from this argument, over twenty-five
empirical studies on possible disincentive effects were undertaken, many of
them focusing on India, which was the largest recipient of food aid in the
1960s.46 The results of these studies and the continued dialogue among food aid
specialists led to a substantial revision in the assumptions and analysis of the
disincentive effect, as noted by Vernon Ruttan, a member of the epistemic
community: "Professional dialogue over the costs and the impact of food aid in
the 1950s and early 1960s was heavily conditioned by the disposal orientation of
the food assistance programs. A good deal of effort went into attempts to test
the disincentive hypothesis, with largely inconclusive results. . . . By the
mid-1970s, the evidence that had been assembled was being interpreted to
imply that under conditions of food scarcity or effective program management
the direct disincentive effects on agricultural production could be quite
small." 47
As members of the epistemic community pointed out, the disincentive effects
would be overcome if the food aid were provided in a manner that generated
increased effective demand on the part of the people in recipient countries.
They also noted that in Egypt, Sri Lanka, and other countries with substantial
subsidization programs, free market price variation was largely eliminated by
government policy. Where governments rather than markets set prices, the
disincentive argument would be largely irrelevant. However, the most important solution to the disincentive problem, according to the epistemic community, was to change the regime principle of additionality. If countries that were
pressed to import food to meet the basic nutritional needs of their people were
allowed to substitute food aid for imports, the disincentive effect would not
occur.
Eliminating the additionality principle, however, has been difficult. Exporting states have had a strong interest in expanding foreign markets, and their
producers have not wanted their food to be donated indefinitely to overseas
countries. Members of the epistemic community have argued that if food aid
were to be focused on poor countries in need and if it were to be used as a
46. These empirical studies were reviewed by Paul J. Isenman and Hans W. Singer in "Food
Aid: Disincentive Effects and Their Policy Implications," Economic Development and Cultural
Change 25.(January 1977), pp. 205-37.
47. Ruttan, "Food Aid," pp. 55-56.
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substitute for commercial imports, this would allow the recipients to invest in
development projects, and the resulting economic growth would in turn make
the recipients more likely customers for imports in the future. In the 1950s and
1960s, agricultural officials and trade representatives of farm commodity
groups gave little weight to this argument. Trade-oriented groups in a number
of countries, including Argentina, Australia, and Canada, were particularly
critical of the U.S. food aid program. Complaining that the U.S. program
undercut their potential commercial markets by creating or distorting international markets, these countries brought their cases before the FAO Committee
on Surplus Disposal (CSD). The CSD worked out an elaborate set of rules for
reviewing food aid proposals, all of which were to receive the imprimatur of the
CSD before the food was actually shipped. Since agriculture was largely
untouched by the GATT rules, the CSD and the International Wheat Council
served as the two major international forums in which the trade-distorting
aspects of food aid could be criticized by food-exporting countries.
In the 1970s, a new approach to resolving the disincentive program arose.
The approach was greatly facilitated by the fact that food prices in 1973-74 had
risen sharply and the amount of food aid from the United States had dropped
from about 10 million to 3 million metric tons while the total food aid from all
donors had fallen from 12 million to 8 million metric tons. In this period, when
Bangladesh was desperately short of cash and famine threatened the lives of an
estimated one million people there, adherence to the additionality principle
seemed onerous, irrelevant, and even perverse. Consequently, since the
mid-1970s, the number of food aid proposals questioned by the CSD has
dropped. The few cases that have been questioned have tended to involve
disputes between the United States and Canada over dairy commodities to be
provided to South American countries. Although the CSD continues to meet
every two weeks in Washington, it deals with few issues of any substance. If the
Uruguay Round eventually succeeds in bringing agriculture under GATT
disciplines, the remaining activities of the CSD may be transferred to GATT, in
which case GATT would substitute its own legal procedures to ensure that food
aid in the 1990s and beyond does not become a disguised form of export
subsidies used to avoid the commitment to agricultural liberalization.
While the regime has not formally abandoned the principle of additionality,
this principle is now rarely enforced. Moreover, as noted earlier, measures to
avoid the disincentive effect are now required by the WFP and mandated in
U.S. legislation through the 1979 Bellman amendment to PIA80. These specific
changes have been accompanied by general changes in the attitudes of
development economists and agencies toward food aid as a resource for use in
development activities. The turnaround of the earlier attitude of the World
Bank is noteworthy. For example, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the one
region where per capita food production has declined since 1970, the World
Bank concluded in the 1980s that few countries could afford to pay for the food
imports they needed and that food aid would be an effective solution to their
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shortages. Indeed, as a result of declining per capita production as well as
periodic droughts, food aid to the region expanded from 2 percent of the total
world food aid in 1970 to between 35 and 40 percent of the total in 1985-90. 48
Although additionality has been largely eliminated in practice, its shadowy
persistence is an important testimony to the continuing influence of commodity
interests and farm groups, especially in the United States. The Department of
Agriculture members of the U.S. interagency committee overseeing food aid
continue to press for additionality, in spite of the Bellman amendment's
emphasis on avoiding disincentives. In addition, other donor governmentsparticularly Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and other food-exporting members of the Cairns Group involved in the GATT negotiations-continue to fear
that the United States, the EC, or both will use food aid as a mechanism to
dump surplus commodities and to steal markets. This fear has been fueled by
the fact that in the mid-1980s, the United States and other food-exporting
countries held extraordinarily large stockpiles, larger in absolute size than in
any previous period. Consequently, the suggestion that the CSD be disbanded
has been rejected, and the additionality principle remains "on the books."
Much like the "blue laws," which still prohibit supermarkets from opening on
Sundays in some American states, the additionality principle has the potential
for disrupting widely adopted practices. Nevertheless, the current practice of
maximizing the extent to which food aid can go to recipient countries as a
substitute for their commercial imports is unlikely to be challenged on the basis
of arguments concerning unfair trade practices. This is because the allocation
of food aid has shifted away from countries such as Brazil, Korea, and Turkey,
where the potential for medium-term commercial market development was
great, and has concomitantly shifted toward the world's most impoverished
countries, where this potential is practically nil. By 1989, Egypt was the only
major commercial importing state that remained a significant food aid
recipient. Recognizing this, domestic export interest groups have adopted a
more permissive attitude toward substitutability. Although they have blocked
the formal removal of the additionality principle, they have no compelling
reason or resources to demand a return to its actual implementation.
The efficiency of resource transfers

Food aid has been criticized for being doubly tied. On the basis of the
original regime principles, it has been tied to commodities from donor states
and also to a particular type of commodity-namely, food. 49 Economists and
development aid administrators have found food aid particularly distasteful
48. See Raymond F. Hopkins, "Food Aid: Solution, Palliative, or Danger for Africa's Food
Crisis?" in Stephen K. Commins, Michael F. Lofchie, and Rhys Payne, eds., Africa's Agrarian
Crisis: The Roots of Famine (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1986), p. 207.
49. During the 1950s and 1960s, tobacco, cotton, and similar agricultural products were
regularly included under the category of "food" provided as food aid, at least in the U.S. program.
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because it seemed too management-intensive and carried heavy transportation
costs. Tony Jackson, for example, argued that in virtually no project was the
providing of food as efficient as providing cash.so The stipulation that aid be
given in the form of food was one reason why World Bank officials were leery of
accepting responsibility for multilateral flows of food aid in 1960.
Singer, who became the most cogent proponent of the counterargument to
this viewpoint, pointed out that all aid is tied. A country receiving cash, for
example, can do nothing useful with it until it turns the cash into the imports
required by some element in the country, whether it be machinery for
industrialization or Mercedes Benz imports for the use of officials. Bringing in
such commodities also carries shipping costs. Moreover, since both the use of
the cash and the shipping arrangements are often less regulated, the opportunities for corruption are greater if cash rather than food is provided.s 1 This
argument has gained increasing weight and has been regularly cited in
documents and reports issued by the World Bank, the WFP, and AID.
The epistemic community members have acknowledged that giving aid in the
form of food can be inefficient. Their point is, however, that other aid may be
equally inefficient. In the case of food aid, they have recommended two
avenues for reducing the inefficiency: flexibility and monetization. In the first
instance, the idea is that the choice of commodities shipped to a particular
country should be altered on the basis of the changing needs of that country.
For example, when a drought in Niger devastated the country's millet harvest in
1984-85, shipments of large volumes of cereal were scheduled. But by 1985-86,
Niger had a substantial rebound in its millet crops and needed nongrain aid,
particularly milk, since the drought had also reduced the number of cattle and
thereby caused a milk shortage. The inability to respond by switching to other
commodities in this and similar cases has been attributable to the efforts of
specific commodity interests to "lock in" particular flows as well as to
bureaucratic inertia. Bureaucrats within development agencies have often
failed to understand food markets in countries targeted for aid, and even the
officials within the recipient countries have sometimes acted in ignorance.
Nevertheless, within the last two decades, the extent to which initial
commodities have been switched from time to time to meet the changing needs
of recipient countries has expanded greatly, and other arrangements have also
been made to improve the efficiency of food aid. Perhaps most notable among
these changes has been the willingness of donors to use trilateral and triangular
transactions. In a trilateral transaction concerning white maize, for example,
the United States, which grows white maize but does not export it, might
provide wheat to Kenya, a country that would otherwise import wheat
commercially, with the understanding that Kenya would then export its white
maize to a designated recipient, such as Sudan or Zambia. In contrast, a
50. Jackson,Against the Grain.

51. See Isenman and Singer, "Food Aid."
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triangular transaction would involve cash from a donor country to purchase
food from a second country or region for use in a third. For example, Japan
might purchase commodities in Thailand for use as food aid elsewhere. Indeed,
donor purchases might even be "local." The UN might buy food in southern
Ethiopia to supply needy populations in northern Ethiopia. In both instances of
LDC purchases, improved efficiencies of the transaction would be aimed at
maximizing the amount of aid received by the recipient.
Another major mechanism for maximizing the resource transfer value of
food aid is monetization-that is, shipping food to recipient countries so that it
can be sold in the local markets-a practice strongly advocated by Shlomo
Reutlinger and other members of the epistemic community. Ideally, the food
aid would be provided in a commodity that is already in short local supply, such
as wheat, rice, or oil. The amount provided would not exceed the amount of
local unmet demand, and the food would be sold on the local market at a price
not lower than that of commercial imports. The currency raised through the
sales of food could then be used to buy local commodities, such as cassava,
plantain, sorghum, and millet, which can in turn be used in school feeding
projects oriented toward nutritional goals or in food-for-work projects involving the building of dams, roads, and irrigation systems. Alternatively, the local
currency could be used to target employment opportunities for poor people
and pay them fully in cash. By stimulating local food sales, monetization of food
aid has the potential of raising the incentive for production of local commodities, and it allows local transportation and handling costs to be minimized.
Since the 1970s and 1980s, under the auspices of the WFP and other food aid
programs, the practice of monetization has been increasing, as has the practice
of swapping commodities. In a swap arrangement involving wheat, for example,
the commodity is delivered in a port city to a wholesale enterprise, and in
exchange for this commodity the ministry of health or other implementing
agency then receives equal or greater volumes of local food commodities for
use in mother-child health clinics or other projects.
Although most recipient governments like the idea of monetization, it is
opposed by some voluntary agencies which fear that the practice will undercut
their role as food managers, that the benefits to the poor may be diverted, or
that having to sell a commodity before nutritional and developmental projects
can be implemented will entail added bureaucratic burdens. Commercial
interests also fear that monetization will further weaken the additionality
principle discussed above. Moreover, the practice remains under debate, since
nutritionists are greatly troubled by the probable elimination of shipments of
commodities such as corn-soy-milk and other high-cost blended foods. 52 Some
52. On the subject of monetization, see National Academy of Science, National Research
Council, Nutritional Aspects of Public Law 480, Title II Commodities (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1982). For a discussion of the National Academy's report, see Shlomo Reutlinger
and Judit Katona-Apte, "The Nutritional Impact of Food Aid," Nutrition Today 19 (May-June
1984), pp. 1-10.
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opponents have formed a narrow food aid coalition with shipping interests and
with the U.S. blended food industry, represented in particular by a half dozen
firms that provide such specialized food aid commodities as com-soy-milk and
are based largely in the Kansas City area.
Perhaps the largest obstacle to the practice of monetization is the widespread idea that directly providing free food to the poor is the best approach to
food aid. The image of dusty refugee camps in which malnourished children
receive handouts of American grain from sacks containing a U.S. logo-an
image that links a national symbol to the alleviation of near-starvation of
endangered populations-is indeed compelling to many U.S. congressional
members involved in decision making regarding PL480 legislation (which still
provides over half of the volume of world food aid) as well as to their
constituents. On the one hand, in extreme cases, perhaps involving 10 percent
of food aid, the direct provision of food through airlifts or convoys is justified,
as in the cases of Jordan, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sudan in 1990. On the other
hand, for about 90 percent of the world's food aid, this imagery is inappropriate
and serves to promote an inefficient use of the aid.
Recognizing the importance of implementing practices that maximize the
resource transfer value of food aid, in the 1980s the EC adopted the policy of
allowing up to 10 percent of its food aid budget to be awarded in cash rather
than commodities, with the cash to be allocated to recipients during periods of
substantial rises in their local food production. In the United States, the
recommendation to monetize grant aid was built into PL480 legislation in the
1980s, and the authority to pursue this practice was expanded in the 1990 U.S.
farm bill. Moreover, the use of swap arrangements by the WFP and other
donors has grown substantially since the early 1980s. These results were in
keeping with the advice given by food aid specialists and reflect their work with
the staff and members of the EC Parliament and U.S. Congress. A similar
impact of the ideas of the specialists is evident in other donor states, including
Japan, which now increasingly provides its food aid through triangular
transactions and with a view toward efficiency as well as diplomacy. The shift
toward an efficiency principle advocated by food aid reformers has thus made
major progress and is reflected in the fact that the proportion of food aid that is
monetized or swapped has gone from practically zero in the 1950s to over 50
percent in the 1990s.53
The criteria for the allocation of food aid
There have been two substantial shifts in the targeting of food aid to
recipient countries. In the early period of food aid, Britain, Germany, Japan,
and other countries that are now donors had been recipients. From the 1950s to

53. This estimate is based on unpublished data from the WFP.
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the early 1970s, the aid shifted to countries of the Middle East and Asia, such as
Iran and India. Nevertheless, China, which would seem a natural recipient for
food aid because of its large population and low nutrition levels, was excluded
for Cold War reasons until the 1980s (see Table 4). Beginning in the 1970s, a
second shift occurred toward the poorest of the developing countries, most of
which were in Africa. This shift meant that countries with a clear potential for
commercial exports were increasingly delinked from food aid. Diplomatic and
trade rationales for the establishment of food aid were thus attenuated. One
major step in this regard was the U.S. rule that was passed by Congress in 1974
and refined in 1975. According to this rule, as noted above, the United States
could not provide more than 25 percent of its concessionally sold food aid to
countries whose incomes were above the level of countries eligible for soft
loans from the World Bank. This level in terms of gross national product per
capita was approximately $500 in the 1970s and $800 in the 1980s. Legislation
in 1990 tightened the rules, lowering the level to a $580 per capita income in
order for a country to be eligible for aid under Title III, a new grant aid
program.
In keeping with this legislation, the United States no longer ships food aid to
countries such as Israel and Portugal. Similarly, the EC countries, in response
to the recommendations of the food aid committee operating within the
Development Directorate (DG8), have shifted their food aid away from
political favorites such as Malta and some of the French dependencies. And
Japan has substantially stepped up its food aid toward Africa and reduced the
share of its total food aid allocated to its important trading partners in Asia.
The allocation issue revolves around the question of priorities: Should not
the poorest, most needy importers of food be given priority? Most groups,
including commodity representatives called to testify before Congress, have
found this priority hard to disavow. As a result, the donor community has raised
the proportion of its food aid to these countries to approximately 90 percent. 54
This does not mean, however, that allocations are never distorted by political or
trade considerations. For example, both Egypt and El Salvador receive
substantially more food aid than would be justified on nutritional grounds (see
Table 5). Given that these countries are U.S. allies whose governments are
dependent on the provision of food aid to their restless populations, it is not
surprising that the United States in particular has provided them with a
disproportionate amount of aid. Other countries clearly receive smaller
amounts than they would if allocations were made solely on the basis of
"need," as is evident in Table 5 and has also been pointed out in the studies of
the IFPRI, an organization which in the 1970s began to produce periodic
estimates of the needs of recipient countries.
54. See Hopkins, "Increasing Food Aid," Table 3, p. 325. According to data from the WFP
"INTERFAIS," 88 percent of food aid was targeted toward "low-income, food-deficit" countries in
1990.
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The shift toward emphasizing need as a principle for allocation was
reinforced in the 1980s, when the USDA began publishing its World Food
Needs and Availabilities. Barbara Huddleston identified two types of needs:
structural needs, which arise from perpetual deficits in a country's domestic
food supply and require long-term project commitments using food, and
transient needs, which arise from a sudden shortfall in supply. She and others,
including Edward Clay, have also made estimates of the food need "gap"-that
is, the difference between the current level of calorie intake in a country's
population and the amount of food aid required to increase the intake to the
level necessary for an active daily life. These gap estimates suggest that food aid
should be doubled or tripled in the 1990s.55
On the one hand, a recent USDA study indicates that while needs play a
large role in the allocation of food aid, particularly among donors other than
the United States, they do not provide the overriding criterion for food
allocations. 56 In short, allocations continue to be affected by a variety of other
factors, including bureaucratic inertia, dramatic publicity such as the 1984 BBC
television documentary on starvation in Ethiopia, and, most important,
persistent concerns with political and export market potential. These concerns
persist in spite of the fact that the use of food aid for diplomatic or trade
purposes is relatively inefficient. Moreover, they persist in the face of strong
opposition both from mainstream development-oriented critics and from the
more radical epistemic community that favors the abolition of all food aid or all
but "emergency" aid. 57
On the other hand, considerations of need have had a marked impact on the
food aid allocation of various donors. Australia, for example, for a long period
allocated its aid on the basis of a need-based computer model, and substantial
regime reform has occurred and affected the policies of other countries,
including the United States. The reform has not abolished the role of other
criteria for allocation, particularly when diplomatic needs arise or become
deeply embedded, as in the situation of Egypt, but it has come to dominate. In
October 1990, for example, the U.S. Congress passed amendments to PL480
calling for the use of food security as the criterion for allocating major bilateral
grant aid. This legislation explicitly cites measures such as levels of income and
calorie intake as factors to be considered. Its aim is to prevent the executive
branch of the U.S. government, when dominated by officials unresponsive to
the core views of the development-oriented epistemic community, from giving
priority to countries with low "needs" and succumbing to pressures from
domestic interest groups whose primary objectives are domestic welfare and
short-term payoffs rather than global welfare and long-term effects of food aid.
55. National Research Council, Food Aid Projections for the Decade of the 1990s.
56. Shapouri and Missiaen, "Food Aid."
57. See Rothschild, "Is It Time to End Food for Peace?"; Frances Moore Lappe, Joseph Collins,
and David Kinley, Aid as Obstacle (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy,
1980); and George, How the Other Half Dies.
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Clearly, the various groups with special interests that played a large role in
establishing the initial principles of the food aid regime are on the defensive
and are adopting new strategies. For example, whereas the U.S. agricultural
interests fought against the U.S. shipping interests in the 1960s over the issue of
using food aid funds to subsidize the maritime industry by requiring that food
be shipped in American (expensive) carriers, the millers and the Association of
Great Lake Ports formed a coalition in the 1980s to support the food aid
principles embedded in earlier U.S. legislation. In the case of food aid, as in the
cases of environmental, whaling, and other issue-areas around which epistemic
communities have emerged, narrow domestic interest groups have tended to
form lobbies that oppose broad but less well organized interests. Classic
debates along this division have occurred over food aid within legislative and
executive branch agencies not only in the United States but also in the EC
Commission and in donor states such as Australia and Canada. 58 Policy
coordination among donors, in general, has strengthened the hand of the
development-oriented epistemic community and given greater exposure to its
views in arguments over allocation and other issues. 59
Within the larger community of activists concerned with alleviating hunger,
however, two debates on the closely related issues of allocation, conditionality,
and goals of food aid continue unresolved. One debate rages between those
who assign top priority to emergency food aid, which has less clear long-term
development value, and the members of the epistemic community, who favor
an early transition from emergency feeding to development activities among
refugee and famine victims. The other debate, which emerged in the 1980s in
tandem with the increased use of conditionality by the IMF, World Bank, and
other international funding agencies, has pitted those who oppose linking food
aid with the types of conditions imposed by these agencies against the epistemic
community members, who support such linkage.
The conditionality of food aid

A quid pro quo has always existed for recipients of foreign aid, including
food aid. In the early years of food aid, maintaining economic and political
alliances was a frequent condition. The United States, for example, provided
disproportionate amounts of food aid to countries in which it had military
bases. In the 1960s, conditionality was extended to agriculture and development policy. In 1966, the United States, still providing 80 to 90 percent of food
58. This claim is based on interviews held in 1984 with food aid officials in Brussels, Ottawa,
Rome, and Tokyo.
59. Members of the U.S. Congress, the EC Parliament, and other legislative bodies have
frequently referred to the writings of members of the epistemic community during their
deliberations. This is evident, for example, in the records of various hearings before U.S.
congressional committees in 1989 and 1990, prior to the passage of amendments to PL480.
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aid, enacted legislation which required that food aid recipients institute
"self-help" measures. Specifically, it required them to pledge that they would
use the proceeds from the sale of food shipments to improve their ability to
feed their populations, either through increased local production or through
investment in other projects that would enhance their economic development
and provide export earnings. Coincident with this legislation, the Johnson
administration placed pressure on India to change its agricultural development
policies. While a change did occur in India, as evident in the country's
substantial shift in policies and the high priority it gave to "green revolution
technology," this was as much due to the anger and resentment generated in
India in response to the U.S. conditions placed on food aid as it was to
compliance with the conditions. The United States was notably less successful
in coercing India into publicly supporting American involvement in the
Vietnam War. 60
Other recipients of food aid have occasionally reacted negatively to donor
requests for reciprocation. For example, when Sukarno was governing Indonesia, his response was that the United States should "go to hell." And in the
early 1960s, when the United States was providing large amounts of food aid to
Egypt and placing pressures on Nasser, the ruler told the U.S. officials to "take
a swim in the Nile." It is true that U.S. food aid to Egypt was abrogated
between 1967 and 1973, but this was a result of the Yorn Kippur War, not a
failure of reciprocity, since food aid allocations to the country were in the
pipeline until the war led Egypt to break diplomatic relations.
The shift to frequent use of conditionality by multilateral aid bodies in the
1980s had a spillover into food aid. IMF conditions attached to short-term
loans and World Bank conditions for structural adjustment lending raised the
issue of whether food aid should also be tied to macroeconomic considerations.
Much to the dismay of those lobbyists who were most concerned with
short-term hunger alleviation and also to the dismay of many recipient
countries whose bureaucracies regularly seek to minimize the conditions
placed on food aid, the development-oriented epistemic community accepted
the spillover implications. In 1986, the WFP took the position that reform of
food policy, associated with the structural adjustments recommended by
international financial institutions, should be linked to food aid. The leaders of
the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) argued that
those countries undertaking reform should receive additional guarantees to
ease their burden of adjustment and protect the sectors of their population
which were most vulnerable during the economic transition entailed by
macroeconomic adjustment. If government social expenditures were reduced
and market interventions aimed at keeping commodity prices low were ended,
then compensatory efforts to soften the social costs of adjustment on those
60. See Paarlberg, Food Trade and Foreign Policy, chap. 3.
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most vulnerable, possibly using food aid, were in order. During the autumn
1986 meeting of the WFP Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs, this
topic was discussed at length. Developing countries, in alliance with the FAO,
voiced strong opposition to any such linkages. The United States, Canada, and
some of the other major bilateral donors were also skeptical of linkage.
However desirable the association of food aid with economic reform might be,
they argued, UN agencies lacked the discipline to allocate food in ways to
support structural adjustment.
Given this opposition, the epistemic community has not yet been totally
successful in establishing a clear priority for food aid to address long-term
hunger problems by linkage to food policy reform, although some movement
toward this goal has occurred. Beginning with the U.S. legislation mandating
that recipient governments institute "self-help" measures in 1966, continuing
into the U.S. Title III legislation in 1977, and following with the proposed links
by the EC between food aid and national food strategies, the idea that food aid
should help long-term development of food self-reliance has been increasingly
adopted by donor states. It has also been adopted by various international
relief and financial organizations. For example, Richard Jolly, the deputy
executive director of UNICEF, has called for "adjustment with a human
face." 61 Similarly, the World Bank has turned its attention to the social
dimensions of adjustment, created food security units within its institutional
structure, and begun efforts to solicit and provide food aid through bilateral or
WFP channels to various countries undertaking structural adjustment, particularly in the food sector. In countries such as Mali and Madagascar, food aid has
been provided to supplement World Bank-negotiated changes in food subsidy
policy. And, more recently, the PL480 legislation in 1990 called for a linkage
between grant food aid and policy reform aimed at improving agriculture and
food production.
These steps taken by donor governments were largely influenced by the
development community, which has been particularly critical of African
policies that depressed prices to producers in the 1970s and contributed
substantially to the peculiar decline in many countries' per capita food
production. Along with the droughts in the mid-1980s, this created the
extraordinary expansion of need for food imports in Africa. Imports have in
fact quadrupled in little over a decade, accompanied by a dramatic shift in food
aid to Africa, as discussed earlier. Only by linking food aid with policy reform
could these circumstances in Africa and similar circumstances in other
recipient countries be alleviated.
Moving from rhetoric to practical implementation of rules and procedures
for uses of food aid, however, requires both a transformation in donor
61. Richard Jolly, Adjustment with a Human Face (Rome: Society for International Development, 1985). Jolly called for the modification in his Barbara Ward lecture, subsequently widely
quoted and reprinted.
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bureaucratic practices and a reversal of resistance in recipient countries. To a
large extent, this has not happened. 62 As the recent joint study of the World
Bank and WFP indicates, the majority of food aid flows continue as emergency
assistance or are provided with unconditional terms. 63 Contrary to the advice
given in the early 1980s by Edward Pisani, the head of the EC Development
Directorate, little food aid is allocated with prior integration into national food
policy. 64 The particular interests of grain marketing agencies and bureaucrats in
recipient countries, coupled with the inertia of bureaucrats in bilateral and
multilateral agencies, have weakened the thrust of reform recommended by the
knowledge-based food aid community. Since conditionality linkages are also
unattractive to those seeking to use food aid to promote commercial trade and
to diplomats looking for a quid pro quo in the form of military alliances or
stability for weak but friendly governments, there is especially clear resistance
to the reform effort from these groups. Despite the fact that producer prices in
a number of recipient countries have moved upward, approximating or
exceeding border prices, they remain low in countries such as Egypt and El
Salvador, where donor state political interests guarantee the continuation of
food aid and oppose quid pro quo conditionality in the area of agricultural
policy. And despite the decades of rhetoric on the topic of reforming economic
policies that impede local food production in recipient countries and prevent
them from obtaining long-term food security, a considerable undertaking to
reorganize both donor and recipient institutions remains to be accomplished.

Lessons for theory and practice
In conclusion, the food aid regime has been reshaped, following proposals from
a special subset of development experts. Today, a set of widely shared norms
exist for the appropriate use of food aid. According to these norms, resource
transfers should take into account the effects of the aid on the food system and
the economy of the recipient country. Scholarly studies and evaluations of
projects undertaken with food aid conclude broadly-to the point of a scientific
consensus-that food aid without sound management can have negative effects
but that food aid with "appropriate" design can be extremely useful. 65
62. See Raymond F. Hopkins, "Food Aid and Policy-Based Lending to Africa: Dilemmas for
States and Donors," in Stephen K. Commins, ed., Africa's Development Challenges and the World
Bank: Hard Questions, Costly Choices (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. 133-55; Raymond
F. Hopkins, "The Evolution of Food Aid: Toward a Development-First Regime," in J. Price
Gittinger et al., eds., Food Policy: Integrating Supply, Distribution, and Consumption (Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 246-59; and WFP, "Review of Food Aid
Programmes and Practices," document CFA/19/5, Rome, 1988.
63. World Bank and WFP, "Food Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa."
64. For a discussion of the Pisani plan, see Kees Tuinenberg, "Experience with Food Strategies
in Four African Countries," in Gittinger et al., Food Policy.
65. See Jackson,Against the Grain; and Ruttan, "Food Aid."
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The fact that reform in the international food aid regime has occurred is to a
significant degree attributable to the efforts of an epistemic community
consisting of scholars and officials from various countries who believed that
food aid could work if the original principles were changed to eliminate
disincentive effects and to encourage the long-term alleviation of hunger
through development-oriented projects. The community's research and arguments about the better use of food aid have been a basic force for the
development of new principles that have been promulgated in authoritative
statements such as those issued in 1979 by the WPP Committee on Food Aid Policies
and Programs and reinforced in 1986 and 1988 studies by the World Bank. 66
From the four case studies of food aid reform reviewed above, two lessons
can be drawn, each of which bears on the argument that ideas and new
knowledge, especially as they arise from and are nurtured by an epistemic
community, play independent and occasionally powerful roles in changing
international regimes and international politics. The first lesson is that
incremental change can occur when the consensual views of an epistemic
community diverge from the politically modal position of the supporters of a
policy. Synoptic change, however, is not plausible. Turbulent conditions, as in
the 1973-74 period, can accelerate change, but when the larger world economic
order is not dissolving, the dominant pattern is incremental adjustment. As
Robert Rothstein had concluded with regard to international reform in recent
decades, consensual knowledge breeds incremental, not radical, change. 67
The second lesson is that the locus for the construction and change of a food
aid regime has shifted from an American-centered one in the 1950s to a more
international one. Although actions by the U.S. government, the founder of the
food aid regime and the major contributor of resources, and by Americans
unaffiliated with the government have played a substantial role in changes in
the rules and regulations, the new knowledge about world food needs and
about effective uses of food aid has emerged globally. Indeed, following the
turbulences of 1973-74, leadership in food aid research and practical innovations, along with a concern for efficient world agricultural production, has
emerged most markedly from non-American sources. For instance, while the
domestic goal of surplus disposal has lingered in the United States, other donor
states have more fully embraced the idea of targeting nonsurplus food aid
toward the broader goal of meeting the food security needs of specific recipient
states. 68 Moreover, in recent decades, most of the ideas for reform in food aid
principles and norms have arisen from international bodies such as the WFP
and IFPRI or from European scholars who increasingly have taken the
leadership role in the epistemic community focused on food aid.
66. See WFP, "Guidelines and Criteria for Food Aid," document CFA/7 /5, Rome, adopted in
1979; World Bank, Poverty and Hunger; and World Bank, The Challenge of Hunger in Africa: A Cal(
to Action (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1988).
67. Robert Rothstein, "Consensual Knowledge and International Collaboration," International
Organization 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 733-62.
68. Shapouri and Missiaen, "Food Aid."
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